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FIRM SURVIVAL, UNCERTAINTY, AND FINANCIAL FRICTIONS: IS THERE
A FINANCIAL UNCERTAINTY ACCELERATOR?
JOSEPH P. BYRNE, MARINA-ELIZA SPALIARA and SERAFEIM TSOUKAS∗
Using a large panel of unquoted UK firms over the period 2000–2009, we examine
the impact of firm-specific uncertainty on corporate failures. In this context we also
distinguish between firms which are likely to be more or less dependent on bank finance
as well as public and nonpublic companies. Our results document a significant effect
of uncertainty on firm survival. This link is found to be more potent during the recent
financial crisis compared with tranquil periods. We also uncover significant firm-level
heterogeneity because the survival chances of bank-dependent and nonpublic firms are
most affected by changes in uncertainty, especially during the recent global financial
crisis. (JEL E44, F32, F34, G32)
I. INTRODUCTION
The global financial crisis had dire economic
consequences for a host of public and private
sector agents across advanced and emerging
economies. The crisis was a time of heightened
uncertainty, financial distress, and widespread
firm closures. All firms continuing as going con-
cerns however, with lower investment after a rise
in uncertainty, may not be equivalent to some
firms closing completely due to uncertainty.1
Reinforcing this effect, firms are more likely to
experience bankruptcy and to bemore susceptible
to macroeconomic and firm specific uncertainty,
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1. It is a standard result in the theoretical literature that
uncertainty is associated with a decline in economic activ-
ity (see Mishkin 2011). Dixit and Pindyck (1994) provide
one appealing explanation for why irreversible investment is
reduced by uncertainty.
in a situation in which they experience poor
financial health (see Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist 1996 and Ghosal and Loungani 2000).
Whether researchers fully model the impact of
uncertainty on economic activity depends upon,
at least partly, whether firms survive or close
their operations completely. Surprisingly there is
limited empirical evidence regarding the effect of
uncertainty on firm closure, for example during
the recent financial crisis.
In this paper, we consider the role of firm-level
uncertainty in firms’ hazard of failure during eco-
nomic downturns. More precisely, we generate a
measure of firm-specific uncertainty that stems
from firms’ volatility in sales. Then we observe
the most recent financial crisis which provides
an interesting set-up to explore the role of uncer-
tainty in firms’ failure. Finally, we look at the
financial health of the firm, reflected in the qual-
ity of its balance sheet. Our empirical work is
based on an assessment of firm-specific uncer-
tainty on firms’ chances of failure using an unbal-
anced panel of 9,457 UK firms between 2000 and
2009. We employ annual firm-level data from the
Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) database.
A discrete proportional hazard model examines
failure probability for firms with different bal-
ance sheet characteristics and exposure in micro
andmacro uncertainty. Then we take into account
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FAME: Financial Analysis Made Easy
SMEs: Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises
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firms’ reliance on bank debt as well as their own-
ership structure (public or private).
In doing so, we contribute to the existing lit-
erature in three important ways. First, we inves-
tigate the link between uncertainty and firm
survival, paying special attention to the most
recent financial crisis. While there is a large and
growing literature on the effects of uncertainty
on firms’ investment, capital structure, and inven-
tories (see Baum, Stephan, and Talavera 2009;
Baum, Caglayan, and Talavera 2010a, 2010b;
Caglayan, Maioli, and Mateut 2012; Caglayan
and Rashid 2014), less attention has been given to
the important dimension of firm survival. Yet, the
potential closure of a great number of businesses
was one of the most visible threats to economic
performance during the Great Recession. As far
as we are aware, this study is the first to provide
a systematic analysis of the link between uncer-
tainty at the micro level, and corporate failures
during the most recent global financial crisis.
Second, this paper accounts for the important
dimension of firm heterogeneity, distinguishing
between firms which are likely to be more or less
dependent on bank finance. This is particularly
important because UK banks interrupted their
lines of credit during the crisis due to liquidity
problems (Bell and Young 2010). This phe-
nomenon was also evident in Europe as shown in
the results of the EU bank lending survey which
points to a substantial reduction in loan supply
and increased lending standards that exposed
bank dependent borrowers. Hence, identifying
those companies which rely heavily on bank
finance will allow us to provide a sharper test
of the effect of uncertainty on firm survival.
We also distinguish between public and pri-
vate firms, because the latter are smaller and
typically associated with the highest degree of
information asymmetry.2
Third, we employ a much broader sample of
firms than other studies in the literature. Our
data-set is made up mainly by unlisted compa-
nies. Unlike previous studies which typically
rely on listed companies (see for example Baum,
Stephan, and Talavera 2009 and Baum, Caglayan,
and Talavera 2010a, 2010b), we use a large panel
of financial data on UK firms, over 98% of
which are not quoted on the stock market. This
characteristic is vitally important because these
2. There is evidence showing that the leverage of private
UK manufacturing firms is more sensitive to firm-specific
risk compared to their public counterparts (Caglayan and
Rashid 2014).
firms are more likely to suffer from information
asymmetry problems and hence will be affected
the most during extreme economic events.
To preview our results, we find significant evi-
dence of the impact of uncertainty on firm sur-
vival in the UK using a broader sample of firms
than is typically used in the literature. Indeed, the
impact of uncertainty is more potent in the recent
crisis period compared with the great modera-
tion. Furthermore our data-set is able to uncover
important heterogeneity in firm behavior. We
identify that both more bank-dependent and non-
public firms are greatly impacted by uncertainty,
and this effect is magnified during the crisis.
Overall, our evidence provides a key contribution
to the literature on firm survival, uncertainty, and
financial distress.
The rest of the article is set out as follows.
In Section II, we provide a short discussion of
the related literature. Section III presents the
hypotheses and the empirical methods used.
Section IV describes our data and presents some
summary statistics. Sections V and VI illustrate
our main empirical results and robustness tests.
Section VII concludes.
II. ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
The theoretical and empirical literature con-
firms that uncertainty is associated with a decline
in output, investment, and employment at the
aggregate and disaggregate level. Significant con-
tributions in this area include, for example, stud-
ies from Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Caballero
(1999), and Bond and Van Reenen (2007). There
is less work, however, on uncertainty and firm
survival. Firms operating with less investment
may not be equivalent to some firms closing com-
pletely due to uncertainty. That is to say, uncer-
tainty may have different implications for the
economy depending upon whether firms close or
not, and hence different implications for long-
run productive capacity of an economy. Bloom
(2007, 2009) highlights how temporary uncer-
tainty may be associated with a temporary down-
turn, but firms shall become active again once
uncertainty subsides. Clearly, if firms are more
susceptible to close down this will have implica-
tions for an economy’s capacity to return to trend
growth. The irreversibility channel of uncertainty
therefore may be more potent when we consider
the possibility that firms may close.
Although there is less work looking at uncer-
tainty and firm survival, there is an established
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literature that examines uncertainty and firm-
level investment and R&D: see Ghosal and
Loungani (2000), Ghosal (2003), Bo and Lensin
(2005), Baum, Caglayan, and Talavera (2010b),
and Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajsek (2013).3
Bloom (2007) argues that uncertainty about
future productivity and demand conditions will
generate fluctuations in investment, hiring, and
productivity. Higher uncertainty generates a
temporary slowdown and bounce back as firms
postpone activity and wait for uncertainty to sub-
side. This effect is expected to be stronger during
recessions. Dixit (1989) emphasizes the impli-
cations of an uncertain environment on entry
and exit decisions of firms. In particular, Ghosal
and Loungani (2000) show that uncertainty has
a negative effect on investment, which is greater
in small-firm-dominated industries. There is,
however, limited empirical evidence regarding
the effect of uncertainty on the UK economy
particularly during the recent financial crisis,
where uncertainty remained at an elevated level
for an extended period of time. Using Granger
causality tests, Haddow et al. (2013) argue that
higher levels of uncertainty have been a factor
restraining the UK recovery and may adversely
affect growth. Denis and Kannan (2013) find in
their vector autoregression analysis that uncer-
tainty shocks have a significant impact on UK
industrial production and gross domestic product
and a somewhat limited effect on employment.
Our paper is also innovative because it con-
siders the interrelation between firm survival,
uncertainty, and financial shocks. It is generally
accepted that following an adverse shock firms
with poorer indicators of creditworthiness on
their balance sheets will bemore constrained than
those that are considered creditworthy. Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996) present a theoreti-
cal channel whereby financial structure impacts
firm behavior. The “flight to quality” by lenders,
identified by Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
(1996), underlies much of the dynamic adjust-
ment observable in the macro-economy due to
the credit channel following an adverse shock.
Furthermore, the experience of UK corporates
after the recent global financial crisis suggests
that the financial system can generate an endoge-
nous cycle (the accelerator) that propagates the
initial shock over time, c.f. Bernanke, Gertler, and
3. For an extensive survey of microeconomic studies
of investment and uncertainty see Bond and Van Reenen
(2007). In particular, prominent work in the literature on firm
investment and uncertainty include Leahy andWhited (1996),
Guiso and Parigi (1999), and Bloom (2007).
Gilchrist (1996). Firms that initially have lower
credit ratings and are refused external finance
on this basis can find that their creditworthi-
ness deteriorates further, putting future external
finance further out of reach. The implication is
that firms that are relatively constrained on the
financial markets will face higher agency costs of
borrowing—a higher “external premium”—for
raising capital from financial markets compared
with the cost of internal finance funded from
retained earnings (see also Bernanke and Gertler
1995). The external finance premium is inversely
related to the firms’ balance sheet, i.e., net worth,
and to macroeconomic conditions, creating a
countercyclical movement in the premium for
external funds, which serves to amplify bor-
rower’s spending and economic activity in the
financial accelerator (see Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist 1996, 1999).
Ghosal and Loungani (2000) suggest the
investment uncertainty nexus operates through
capital market imperfections. Ghosal (2003)
highlights that uncertainty and sunk costs at the
industry level have a large negative impact on
entry and exit probabilities of firms.4
The interrelationship between uncertainty,
investment, and financial variables is discussed
by Baum, Stephan, and Talavera (2009) and
Baum, Caglayan, and Talavera (2010a, 2010b).
The aforementioned studies identify an impor-
tant channel by which uncertainty reduces firm
access to credit, consequently leading to lower
investment. Baum, Stephan, and Talavera (2009)
identify a strong negative relationship between
debt and macroeconomic uncertainty.
Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajsek (2013) also
examine how macroeconomic uncertainty influ-
ences investment through financial frictions.
Using macro and micro evidence, they estab-
lish that uncertainty impacts investment largely
through credit spreads. Specifically, increases
in uncertainty are associated with a widening
of credit spreads and a decline in output. By
delineating an alternative transmission mecha-
nism, this calls into question the option value of
waiting approach that exists in the literature. As
a consequence this research proposes a specific
channel by which uncertainty can impact upon
firm survival.
Finally, Huynh, Petrunia, and Voia (2010) and
Huynh and Petrunia (2010) present empirical evi-
dence on the determinants of firm survival and
4. In this context, firm size may be an
important determinant.
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growth, showing that firms’ leverage matters for
both activities and has a nonlinear impact on sur-
vival. Indeed, it may be the case that high leverage
(or low profitability) does not have a persistent
effect on economic activity, but the consequences
of leverage for firm survival impinge upon recov-
ery from recession. Such a viewmay contribute to
our understanding of business cycles (Hall 2010).
In the next section, we review specific research
questions and discuss our empirical methods.
III. HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY
A. Research Questions
This paper seeks to consider a number of
research questions. First, we evaluate the direct
effect of micro uncertainty on firms’ failures for
UK firms, the vast majority of which are not
quoted on the stock market. After controlling
for macro uncertainty and a number of firm-
specific and financial indicators we might expect
that firm-level uncertainty will lead to higher
failure rates.
Second, we examine the impact of firm-
specific uncertainty on the hazard of failure
in and out of the most recent financial cri-
sis. This can be tested through interactions
between the measures of uncertainty and a time-
period dummy, which is aimed at capturing the
2007–2009 global financial crisis. One should
expect that firms will be more likely to fail during
periods of economic uncertainty because firms
have to postpone their activities. This effect
might be amplified during economic down-
turns because firms find it extremely difficult to
attract external funding at a reasonable cost and
therefore have to cut down their activities.
Third, we test the probability of failure for
different groups of firms in and out of the cri-
sis, taking into account the uncertainty measures.
Because of the nature of our data, we take into
account firm heterogeneity by looking at the
extent to which firms rely upon bank funding. As
banks significantly restricted loans toward small-
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) during the
financial crisis, it is reasonable to suppose that
bank-dependent firms are likely to have suffered
more than their less bank-dependent counter-
parts. This argument is in line with Bell and
Young (2010), who discuss statistics on loans to
SMEs and syndicated loan spreads in the UK.
They note that while investment-grade spreads
peaked in 2008, they have fallen back after
the crisis. We should expect to find that more
bank-dependent firms will be more likely to fail
when faced with higher levels of uncertainty
compared with their less bank-dependent coun-
terparts. Moreover, this link should be more
important during the crisis. Finally, we intend
to corroborate our results using the distinction
between public and nonpublic firms. The latter
group is more likely to be financially constrained
and hence may respond more strongly to uncer-
tainty compared with the former group of firms,
especially during extreme economic events.
B. Empirical Specifications
Baseline Model. To evaluate the effect of uncer-
tainty on the likelihood of firm failure, we use a
complementary log–log model (cloglog), a dis-
crete time version of the Cox proportional hazard
model. This methodology is particularly indi-
cated given that we are interested in investi-
gating the determinants of the timing of firms’
chances of failure. Considering this objective our
analysis is related to the passage of time before
the event of failure occurs. The cloglog model
accounts for the incompletely observed lifespan
of firms surviving past the sample and allows us
to capture the exact time of failure, addressing
in this way the potential right censoring bias.5
The assumption of the proportional hazard model
is that the hazard ratio depends only on time at
risk, θ0(t) (the so-called baseline hazard) and on
explanatory variables affecting the hazard inde-
pendently of time, exp(β′K). The hazard ratio is
then given by:
(1) θ (t,K) = θ0 (t) exp
(
β′K
)
The discrete-time hazard function, h(j,K),
shows the interval hazard for the period between
the beginning and the end of the jth year after
the first appearance of the firm. This hazard rate,
which is the rate at which firms fail at time t
given that they have survived in t− 1, takes the
following form:
(2) h (j,K) = 1 − exp
[
− exp
(
β′K + γj
)]
where we are particularly interested in identify-
ing the β parameters, which show the effect of the
explanatory variables incorporated in vectorK on
5. To capture the particular nature of the data-set, given
that it is collected on a yearly basis, the cloglog model is
more appropriate than the standard Cox model (see Görg
and Spaliara 2014). Also, see Jenkins (2005) for an excel-
lent overview of complementary log–log and proportional
hazard models.
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the hazard rate. In the tables presented below,
we report coefficients rather than hazard ratios
(exponential coefficients). The interpretation of
the coefficients is as follows. A positive coeffi-
cient indicates that an increase in the associated
explanatory variable leads to an increase in the
hazard of failure in any given year. A negative
coefficient estimate suggests that the explanatory
variable is negatively associated with the haz-
ard and therefore reduces the probability of fail-
ure. When interpreting our results, it is useful to
look at the exponentiated coefficients, which have
the interpretation of the ratio of the hazard for
one unit change in the explanatory variable. In
our discussion of the findings, we will present
detailed examples of how we calculate the mag-
nitude of the coefficients.6
We set out a benchmark model to estimate
how firms’ probability of failure is affected by
uncertainty and their financial conditions:
h (j,X) = 1 − exp
[
−exp
(
β0 + β1Sigma(3)
+ β2X + β3Y + γj
)]
where Sigma represents the uncertainty measured
at the micro (firm) level. The sign and signifi-
cance of β1 shows the importance of uncertainty
on the probability of firms’ failure. Vectors X and
Y denote a set of control variables that have been
found to be influential in firm survival studies.We
partition the control variables into financial and
other explicators.
Measuring Firm-Specific Uncertainty. There
is an extensive literature examining the impact
of uncertainty in other contexts and we seek
to exploit that literature. Several studies use
uncertainty on forecast earnings or prof-
its: von Kalckreuth (2000) and Lensink, Bo,
and Sterken (1999). Baum, Caglayan, and
Talavera (2010b) use a capital asset pricing
model measure to identify the impact of firm
uncertainty on investment. To measure firm
uncertainty Leahy and Whited (1996) and
Bloom, Bond, and Van Reenen (2001) use
volatility of stock prices. Ghosal and Loungani
(2000) use profit forecasting to predict future
profit in order to assess the impact of uncer-
tainty on investment. Sales have been employed
6. γj is the log of the difference between the integrated
baseline hazard evaluated at the end and the beginning of
the interval. It, thus, captures duration dependence. We do
not impose any restrictions on these parameters, rather we
estimate a full set of gammaj time dummies.
as a proxy for firm-specific uncertainty by
Lensink, Bo, and Sterken (1999) and Caglayan,
Maioli, and Mateut (2012) who test the effect
of sales volatility on inventory investment
and by Garcia-Vega, Guariglia, and Spaliara
(2012) who assess the effect of uncertainty
on exporting.7
The heterogeneity amongst firms in our data
allows us to employ a proxy of firm-specific
uncertainty using firms’ sales in line with previ-
ous studies (Caglayan, Maioli, and Mateut 2012;
Garcia-Vega, Guariglia, and Spaliara 2012;
Lensink, Bo, and Sterken 1999; Morgan, Rime,
and Strahan 2004). In particular, we construct
our uncertainty measure by estimating first an
AR(1) model of sales augmented with time and
industry-specific dummies.8 To take into account
the panel data nature of our data-set we employ a
GMM system estimator (see Arellano and Bover
1995; Blundell and Bond 1998). We verify that
the diagnostics do not indicate any problems
regarding the choice and the relevance of our
instruments. Uncertainty is then computed as
the standard deviation of the firm’s total real
sales calculated over the 3 years preceding and
including year t.9,10
Other Influences. X is a vector of financial
variables Leverage and Profitability. Both vari-
ables capture different aspects of the financial
health of a firm. We control for firms’ financial
health motivated by the theoretical model of
Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006)11 and previ-
ous empirical studies (Bridges and Guariglia
7. Other authors use firm surveys of expectations (see
Guiso and Parigi 1999; Patillo 1998) or a theoretical measure
of microeconomic uncertainty (Carlsson 2007).
8. Alternative measures of firm level of uncertainty can
in principle be extracted from, for example, Confederation
of British Industry survey data (see Mitchell, Mouratidis,
and Weale 2007). However, the concordance of firms would
present significant challenges and coverage may be incom-
plete for our unlisted firms. Moreover multivariate GARCH
methods based upon the cross sectional data could be adopted,
but this would present significant computational challenges
given the short time dimension of the data.
9. We check the sensitivity of our results to using a
different measure of sales uncertainty computed over the 4
years preceding and including year t (see Section VI).
10. It should be noted that given the way in which we
calculate uncertainty, this variable is not available for the
years 2000 and 2001. For this reason, all regressions which
contain our main measure of uncertainty are based on the
sample 2002–2009.
11. Their model generates a role for capital structure in
an asymmetric information setup. The theoretical frameworks
on survival were first introduced by Hopehayn (1992) and
Jovanovic (1982) without considering a role for moral hazard.
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2008; Bunn and Redwood 2003; Huynh, Petru-
nia, and Voia 2010). To begin with financial
leverage (Leverage), which is measured as the
ratio of total current liabilities over total assets,
we note that high levels of existing debt are
associated with a worse balance sheet situa-
tion, which would increase moral hazard and
adverse selection problems, and lead to the
inability of firms to obtain external finance at a
reasonable cost (see Levin, Natalucci, and Zakra-
jsek 2004; Mizen and Tsoukas 2012). Zingales
(1998) and Bridges and Guariglia (2008) argue
that higher leverage results in higher failure
probabilities. Accordingly, we expect a positive
relationship between leverage and the probability
of survival.
Profitability (Profitability) is defined as the
ratio of the firm’s profits before interests and
tax to its total assets. We use this indicator to
measure a firm’s efficiency. It is widely accepted
that internal funds can serve as a buffer to
absorb unexpected losses, reducing the proba-
bility of insolvency and, therefore, the expected
bankruptcy cost (see Bridges and Guariglia 2008;
Bunn and Redwood 2003). We therefore expect
to find profitability to decrease the probability
of failure.
The covariates used in the vector Y are all cho-
sen in view of other work on firm survival. We
add the firm size (Size) measured as the loga-
rithm of real total assets. According to Geroski
(1995), a firm’s size plays an important role
in determining firm failures. The argument is
that large firms experience higher survival prob-
abilities than their smaller counterparts because
they have access to alternative sources of exter-
nal finance and they are less informationally
opaque. Thus large firms are less likely to fail
than small firms (Clementi and Hopenhayn 2006;
Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson 1998). In our
analysis, we expect to find a positive relation-
ship between firm size and the probability of
survival. We also include the age of the firm
(Age) which measures the number of years since
the firm’s birth. Firms with an established track
record are less likely to fail than those that are
younger because they are usually more able to
withstand past economic and financial down-
turns and therefore face a smaller liquidation
risk. This would be the case both for domestic
and multinational firms as noted by Görg and
Strobl (2002). Consequently, we anticipate a neg-
ative relationship between age and the probability
of failure.
In addition, we account for whether a firm
is part of a larger corporation or a group (UK
or foreign). Following the relevant literature,
we construct the dummy variable Group, which
takes the value one if a firm is part of a group,
and zero otherwise. We expect to observe a
negative relationship between this variable and
the hazard of failure since group firms are likely
to have better access to capital markets and
to respond more quickly to shocks than sin-
gle firms, due to better information processing
(Bridges and Guariglia 2008). We also control
for foreign ownership by using a dummy vari-
able, Ownership, equal to one if the share of
foreign ownership in a firm’s equity exceeds
24.99%, and zero otherwise. The evidence
on the impact of foreign-owned firms on sur-
vival chances is mixed.12 Therefore, we should
expect ownership to have a significant effect
on failure but its sign will be determined by
the data.
In vector Y we also control for the macroe-
conomic conditions by adding the real exchange
rate, which measures the exchange rate environ-
ment. Baggs, Beaulieu, and Fung (2009) doc-
ument a negative association between survival
and appreciation of the Canadian dollar. We
expect the exchange rate (Exchange) to be pos-
itively associated with the firm’s probability to
fail. In addition, we control for aggregate uncer-
tainty by using a policy uncertainty measure.
This economic policy uncertainty measure for
the UK is drawn from Baker, Bloom, and Davis
(2013). It is constructed with a 50% weight
on a news-based component from the Finan-
cial Times and The Times newspapers (i.e., the
mention of policy relevant terms) and 50% on
Consensus Economics CPI and budget deficit
forecaster disagreement. We expect higher levels
of aggregate uncertainty to reduce firms’ chances
of survival. Finally, our model includes a full
set of time, industry, and regional dummies. To
obtain efficient estimators and unbiased standard
errors we apply the Huber-White sandwich or
robust estimator.
The Effect of the Crisis. To examine whether the
hazard of failure differs in crisis years compared
12. Using data from Ireland and Indonesia, Görg and
Strobl (2003) and Bernard and Sjöholm (2003), respectively,
show that multinationals are more likely to exit than domes-
tic firms. On the other hand, Blalock, Gertler, and Levine
(2008), and Desai and Forbes (2008) find that global engage-
ment improves firms’ performance, and hence reduces their
likelihood of failure.
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with tranquil periods, we augment Equation (3)
with a financial crisis dummy (Crisis), which
takes value one over the period 2007–2009, and
zero otherwise. The financial crisis might have
both a direct and an indirect impact on exit by
magnifying the effect of uncertainty on firms’
likelihood to fail.
h (j,X) = 1 − exp
[
−exp
(
β0 + β1Sigma ∗(4)
Crisis + β2Sigma ∗ (1 − Crisis) + β3
Crisis + β4X + β5Y + γj
)]
This test is motivated by the financial-
accelerator-related hypothesis, according to
which a deterioration in economic conditions
negatively affects the health of firms’ balance
sheets. In these circumstances, firms facing
increased levels of uncertainty might face a
higher probability of failure during the crisis
than outside. The sign and significance of the
interacted terms will reveal the extent to which
the impact of uncertainty on firm survival differs
during tranquil and turbulent periods. We expect
the effects of changes in the uncertainty on
firms’ chances of failure to be stronger during
the crisis (i.e., we expect to observe that β1 > β2).
Finally, the crisis term is allowed to influence the
probability of firm failure directly, judged from
the sign and significance of the coefficient β3.
Capturing Firm Heterogeneity. At the next stage
we aim to assess whether changes in the level of
uncertainty of firms in and out of the crisis will
have a differential impact on their probability to
fail, taking into account firm heterogeneity. To
test this hypothesis we consider whether firms are
more or less bank dependent. This test is moti-
vated by recent evidence, both in the UK and the
United States, which shows an increase in loan
spreads during the crisis. In particular, Santos
(2011) and Bell and Young (2010) document that
banks interrupted their lines of credit due to liq-
uidity problems, and thus we should expect bank
dependent firms to be more severely affected dur-
ing the financial crisis.
As in Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993) and
Tsoukas (2011), we define bank-dependent firms
based on their ratio of short-term debt to total debt
(Mix). As short-term debt is predominantly made
up of bank finance, this ratio is a good proxy of
bank dependency.13 We modify Equation (3) to
13. To ensure that our results are robust, we carry out
our estimations using an alternative definition of bank depen-
dency based on short-term debt over current liabilities.
contain interaction terms between the Mix ratio,
the Crisis dummy, and the uncertainty measure.
This yields the following empirical model:
h (j,X) = 1 − exp
[
−exp
(
β0 + β1Sigma ∗
(5)
Mix ∗ Crisis + β2Sigma ∗ Mix ∗ (1 − Crisis)
+β3Mix + β4Crisis + β5X + β6Y + γj
)]
The sign and significance of the interacted
terms will reveal whether firms more (less) likely
to be bank dependent are less (more) likely to
survive during the crisis compared with tran-
quil periods. We also allow both Mix and the
crisis dummy to influence firms’ chances of
failure directly.
Finally, we run the abovemodel distinguishing
between public and private companies. Accord-
ing to our hypothesis, private firms are more
likely to face financial constraints and hence may
respond more strongly to uncertainty compared
with public firms, especially during the crisis
period. We expect, therefore, the behavior of pri-
vate firms to match that of firms with high depen-
dence on banks.14
IV. DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
A. Data Description
Our data set is drawn from the annual account-
ing reports taken from the FAME database,
published by Bureau Van Dijk Electronic Pub-
lishing (BvDEP). We employ data for the period
2000–2009.15 We use a rich financial data-set
that comprises mainly non-publicly traded UK
manufacturing firms. Our database includes a
majority of firms that are not traded on the stock
market or quoted on alternative exchanges such
as the Alternative Investment Market (AIM)
and the Off-Exchange (OFEX) market. In fact,
98.2% of our sampled firms are private, while
1.8% are public companies. This figure is compa-
rable with recent studies that employ the FAME
14. To ensure that bank dependence and the distinction
between private/public firms control for different firm aspects,
we control for firms’ ownership structure when estimating
models of bank dependency and vice versa.
15. A maximum of 10 years of complete data history can
be downloaded at once. We have only selected firms that have
unconsolidated accounts: this ensures that the majority of the
firms in our data-set are relatively small. Moreover, it avoids
the double counting of firms belonging to groups, which
would be included in the data-set if firms with consolidated
accounts were also part of it.
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TABLE 1
Detailed Statistics of Size Variables
Employees Assets Turnover
(1) (2) (3)
25% 31 2,249 4,000
50% 85 4,748 9,586
75% 234 13,932 25,442
Observations 85,231 123,535 78,760
Notes: The table presents the median and the upper and
lower quartiles of three size measures. “Employees” denotes
the number of employees. “Assets” represents total assets.
“Turnover” is the sum of domestic and overseas turnover.
Assets and turnover aremeasured in thousands of UK sterling.
database to analyze UK firms’ behavior (see Brav
2009; Caglayan and Rashid 2014; Michaely and
Roberts 2012). Moreover, this is an appeal-
ing characteristic of the data as it allows our
measures of uncertainty and financial health to
display a wide degree of variation across obser-
vations in our sample. Having data on unquoted
firms is particularly valuable in our case, as the
unlisted companies are generally the smallest,
youngest, and most-bank dependent firms. They
are, therefore, more likely to be associated with
the highest degree of information asymmetry and
hence face an increased probability of failure,
especially during extreme economic conditions.
Looking at the quartile distribution of various
size measures in Table 1, we observe the varia-
tion over firms in terms of turnover, total assets,
and number of employees. The median UK firm
in our sample has an average of 85 employees,
£4.7 million assets, and £9.5 million turnover
which falls in the small and medium-sized
enterprise category.16
To accurately construct our dependent vari-
able we also take into account that some firms
may exit due to mergers and acquisitions. Fol-
lowing Görg and Spaliara (2014), we employ
BureauVanDijk’s ZEPHYRdatabase which con-
tains information on mergers and acquisitions.
Using ZEPHYR we are able to identify and drop
those firms that are mistakenly coded as “failed”
in our data. This ensures that our indicator vari-
able has been accurately constructed to capture
16. In theUK, sections 382 and 465 of the CompaniesAct
2006 define a small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) for
the purpose of accounting requirements. According to this, a
small company is one that has a turnover of not more than £6.5
million, a balance sheet total of not more than £3.26 million,
and not more than 50 employees. A medium-sized company
has a turnover of not more than £25.9 million, a balance
sheet total of not more than £12.9 million, and not more than
250 employees.
FIGURE 1
The Evolution of Firm-Specific Uncertainty
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firms that failed and did not exit due to mergers
and acquisitions.
Following normal selection criteria used in the
literature, we drop firms that do not have com-
plete records on our main regression. To con-
trol for the potential influence of outliers, we
exclude observations in the .5% tails for each of
our regression variables. Our final panel, which is
unbalanced, includes 9,457 firms corresponding
to 51,101 observations.
B. Descriptive Analysis
As a way of preliminary analysis, we depict
the evolution of micro and macro uncertainty in
Figures 1 and 2. In Figure 1 we plot average val-
ues of the firm-specific uncertainty per annum.
A period of quiescence during the Great Mod-
eration is followed by a considerable increase
in uncertainty associated with Lehman’s collapse
and the Global Financial Crisis in 2008 and 2009.
We observe that both measures of uncertainty fol-
low a similar trend over our sample period.17
We present summary statistics for the vari-
ables used in our empirical analysis in Table 2.
The figures are presented for all firms (column
1), for failed and surviving firms (columns 2 and
3) and for firms during and outside the crisis
(columns 5 and 6) reporting means and standard
deviations. Further, the p values of a test for the
equality of means between failing and surviving
17. Other indicators of economic uncertainty for the UK
such as the Confederation of British Industry firm survey on
demand uncertainty and the FTSE option-implied volatility
paint a very similar picture.
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FIGURE 2
The Evolution of Aggregate Uncertainty
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firms as well as crisis and noncrisis periods are
presented in columns 4 and 7, respectively. We
can see that the average failure rate in our sample
is 16.1% which is much higher compared with
previous UK studies (e.g., Bunn and Redwood
2003). The difference between our figures and
theirs may probably be due to the fact that their
sample covers a much earlier time period (up to
2003). It is therefore possible that failure rates
have increased sharply over themost recent years.
This is also consistent with statistics reported in
the Office for National Statistics (ONS Business
Demography Bulletins, 2007, 2008, and 2009).
When comparing failing and surviving firms,
we note that the former exhibit a substantially
higher firm-specific uncertainty. We also observe
that surviving firms are less indebted and more
profitable compared with failing firms. These
statistics confirm previous empirical results (see
Bridges and Guariglia 2008; Bunn and Redwood
2003; Zingales 1998) that firms which display
healthier balance sheets are less likely to fail. In
addition, we find that survivors are larger and
older which is in line with previous empirical and
theoretical research, which shows that the prob-
ability of exit decreases with firm size and age
(e.g., Jovanovic 1982; Clementi and Hopenhayn
TABLE 2
Summary Statistics
All Firms Fail=1 Fail=0 Diff. Crisis=1 Crisis=0 Diff.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Fail .161 1.00 .00 — .165 .159 .014
(.37) (.00) (.00) (.37) (.36)
Sigma .159 .187 .157 .000 .164 .158 .000
(.16) (.19) (.16) (.16) (.17)
Leverage .466 .527 .459 .000 .440 .475 .000
(.27) (.31) (.27) (.28) (.27)
Profitability .076 .037 .081 .000 .088 .072 .000
(.16) (.19) (.16) (.17) (.16)
Size 3.953 3.728 3.984 .000 4.040 3.922 .000
(1.38) (1.29) (1.39) (1.32) (1.41)
Age 25.048 24.606 25.133 .000 28.396 23.602 .000
(23.01) (23.47) (22.92) (22.64) (23.02)
Group .212 .099 .233 .000 .210 .213 .325
(.41) (.29) (.42) (.41) (.41)
Ownership .174 .083 .190 .000 .173 .173 .795
(.38) (.27) (.39) (.37) (.38)
Exchange 96.693 96.585 96.714 .130 84.229 102.081 .000
(11.57) (5.01) (4.95) (9.20) (7.68)
Policy 97.539 97.899 97.470 .110 140.106 79.141 .000
(37.59) (37.89) (37.53) (38.49) (15.70)
Observations 51,101 4,491 46,610 16,854 34,247
Notes: The table presents sample means. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Fail is a dummy that equals one if
the firm fails, and zero otherwise. Crisis is a dummy representing the recent crisis and takes the value one in years 2007–2009, and
zero otherwise. Diff. is the p value of the test statistic for the equality of means between failing and nonfalling firms (columns
1 and 2) as well as between crisis and noncrisis periods (columns 5 and 6). Sigma is a measure of firm-specific uncertainty.
Leverage is measured as the firm’s total current liabilities to assets ratio. Profitability is the ratio of the firm’s profits before
interest and tax to its total assets. Size is denoted by the log of real assets. Age is defined as the difference between the present
year and the firm’s date of incorporation. Group is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is part of a group UK or foreign, and
zero otherwise. Ownership is a dummy equal to one if the share of foreign ownership in a firm’s equity exceeds 25%, and zero
otherwise. Exchange is the real effective exchange rate. Policy is a measure of aggregate uncertainty. Firm-specific variables are
measured in thousands of UK sterling.
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2006). Furthermore, survivors are more likely to
be part of a UK group and foreign owned. These
differences between sub-samples are statistically
significant in all cases.
Moving to the comparison between crisis and
out of crisis periods (columns 5 and 6), we note
that the average failure rate and the firm-specific
uncertainty are higher during the crisis. These dif-
ferences are statistically significant in both cases.
In addition, during the crisis firms display lower
values of leverage and higher profitability. This
is consistent with the notion that firms took a
substantial amount of short-term debt in the pre-
crisis period and perhaps were unable to extend it
further in the later years of our sample. The latter
statistic is in line with ONS data on profitability
for UK manufacturing firms.18 p Values suggest
that differences between sub-samples are statisti-
cally significant in all but one case.
Taken together, these summary statistics sug-
gest that there is a significant correlation between
firms’ failure rates, firm-specific uncertainty, and
firms’ financial health. This relationship is even
more important during the global financial cri-
sis. It remains to be seen, though, whether these
preliminary findings continue to hold when we
control for a number of factors which are known
to play a role in determining firms’ survival
chances. In the sections that follow, we test within
a formal regression analysis framework whether
the sensitivity of survival to firm-specific uncer-
tainty is significantly higher during the financial
crisis compared with tranquil periods.
V. MAIN RESULTS
A. Firm-Specific Uncertainty and the
Financial Crisis
To assess the role of the firm-specific uncer-
tainty in firms’ hazard of failure, we focus on
the direct and indirect (through interactions with
the crisis dummy) impact on the probability of
survival. We specify a time–period dummy vari-
able to indicate that firms faced the 2007–2009
financial crisis, and this crisis dummy takes the
value of one during this period, and the value zero
otherwise. Results are reported in Table 3. In col-
umn 1, we include firm-specific uncertainty along
with time, industry, and regional dummies. In the
subsequent column, uncertainty is included along
with a number of firm-specific and other control
18. See the ONS Statistical Bulletin for details on UK
firms’ profitability.
TABLE 3
Firm Survival and Uncertainty
(1) (2) (3)
Sigma .869*** .782***
(13.96) (11.38)
Sigma*Crisis 1.152***
(5.74)
Sigma*(1-Crisis) .741***
(10.21)
Crisis .245***
(3.78)
Leverage .009* .009*
(1.86) (1.85)
Profit −.024* −.024*
(−1.89) (−1.87)
Size −.182*** −.182***
(−15.47) (−15.47)
Age −.002** −.002**
(−2.47) (−2.47)
Group −.990*** −.990***
(−19.33) (−19.35)
Ownership −.620*** −.620***
(−12.59) (−12.59)
Exchange 6.469*** 6.478***
(3.76) (3.76)
Policy 1.499*** 1.501***
(3.71) (3.71)
Observations 51,762 51,101 51,101
Log-likelihood −14,101 −13,031 −13,029
Test of equality (p value)
Sigma .053
Notes: Proportional hazard model results are reported.
The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm
fails, and 0 otherwise. Robust z-statistics are presented in
parentheses. The F test of equality for Sigma refers to
the test of equality between Sigma*Crisis and Sigma*(1-
Crisis). Time, industry, and regional dummies are included in
all models.
*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant
at 1%.
variables to assess the consequences of a ceteris
paribus increase in uncertainty on the probabil-
ity of firms’ failure. Column 3 explores whether
in addition to having a direct effect on firms’
chances of survival, the financial crisis may also
have an asymmetric response through interac-
tions with the firm-specific uncertainty.19
To begin with, the coefficient on the firm-
specific uncertainty exerts a positive and highly
significant effect on failure. This finding is
not only statistically but also economically
important. The predicted probability of exit,
evaluated at the mean of the independent vari-
ables, is 9%. The coefficient on the firm-specific
19. Time dummies are included in all models, with the
exception of the crisis years 2007–2009 when the crisis term
is included on its own.
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uncertainty suggests that the probability of fail-
ure is rising, which translates to an increase in
the predicted exit probability by around 12.5
percentage points. This is calculated at the
mean exit probability of 9%, using the expo-
nentiated coefficient: exp(.869) – 1 = 1.384,
(1.384*9) = 12.46%.20 Consistent with our
expectations, increases in the firm-specific
uncertainty will therefore negatively affect firms’
survival prospects.
The point estimates on the control and finan-
cial variables behave as conjectured. Specifically,
the coefficient associated with the aggregate
uncertainty is positive and precisely determined,
suggesting that higher levels of macro uncer-
tainty are likely to increase the incidence of
corporate failure. In addition, firms which are
less indebted and more profitable are less likely
to fail. Larger and older firms are also less at
risk compared to smaller and younger companies
that lack track record reputation. These results
are in line with a number or previous studies
(Zingales 1998; Bridges and Guariglia 2008;
Görg and Spaliara 2014). Regarding the remain-
ing control indicators, being part of a group
and being foreign owned improve the survival
prospects of firms (Bridges and Guariglia 2008).
Lastly, as in Baggs, Beaulieu, and Fung (2009),
a stronger local currency raises the probability
of firm failure, while higher levels of aggregate
uncertainty will raise the probability of failure.
This is consistent with the existing evidence of
negative impact of uncertainty on investment
at micro level, see for example Bloom, Bond,
and Van Reenen (2007) and Baum, Caglayan,
and Talavera (2010b) for a panel of UK and US
firms respectively.
Moving to the interaction terms, as shown
in column 3 of Table 3, we gauge the dif-
ferential role of microeconomic uncertainty in
firm survival. In particular, we find that uncer-
tainty has a more potent role during the crisis,
because the coefficient on the interaction with
the crisis dummy is positive and highly signifi-
cant. The difference in this effect across the two
time periods is economically important: a 1%
increase in the firm-specific uncertainty would
raise the hazard of failure by 19.45% over the
crisis period 2007–2009, but only by 9.88% dur-
ing tranquil periods. The p value for the equality
20. As already noted, the hazard ratio can be calculated as
exp(k) for the kth regressor. Hence, in column 1 the coefficient
on sigma is .869, which is equivalent to a hazard ratio of
exp(.869) – 1 = 1.384.
of the coefficients indicates a statistically signifi-
cant difference between the two coefficients. In
addition, we find that the crisis dummy attains
a positive and highly significant coefficient indi-
cating that during the crisis period the proba-
bility of firm failure is higher compared with
tranquil times.
B. The Role of Firm-Level Heterogeneity
Bank-Dependent Firms. Having identified a
significant relationship between firm-specific
uncertainty, the financial crisis, and probability
of failure, we now explore whether this rela-
tionship differs when we consider firms which
are likely to be dependent on bank finance.
According to our hypothesis, bank-dependent
firms have had their lines of credit dramatically
reduced during the recent crisis. Given their
inability to finance their activities from exter-
nal sources (e.g., stocks or bond finance), they
are likely to have suffered more than their less
bank-dependent counterparts. Consequently, we
anticipate the effect of firm-specific uncertainty
to be stronger for firms exhibiting a greater
reliance on bank debt compared with their
less-bank dependent counterparts. Therefore, in
Table 4 we explore the impact of interactions
between crisis and noncrisis periods and firm-
specific uncertainty for firms that are more or
less likely to be categorized as bank dependent.
Focusing on rows 1 and 2 of Table 4, we
observe that as firms rely more on bank debt, the
measure of firm-specific uncertainty displays a
larger coefficient during the crisis than outside.
A test for the equality of the coefficients is
reported at the foot of the table. It shows that the
differences in the coefficients on the interactions
during and outside the crisis are statistically sig-
nificant. To put it differently, the greater sensitivi-
ties of firm survival to changes in the firm-specific
uncertainty documented for more-bank firms dur-
ing the crisis than outside suggests that higher
levels of uncertainty coupled with limited access
to credit may play a detrimental role in explain-
ing the high number of failures in the UK during
the most recent financial crisis.
With respect to the other control variables,
it is worth noting that the crisis dummy and
the Mix ratio are both positive but quantitatively
unimportant. Lastly, the remaining firm-specific
and macroeconomic variables retain their signif-
icance, with the only exception being the private
dummy which enters with the expected positive
sign but it is not precisely determined.
12 ECONOMIC INQUIRY
TABLE 4
Uncertainty, Bank Dependency, and the Crisis
Sigma*Mix*Crisis 1.583***
(6.73)
Sigma*Mix*(1-Crisis) .845***
(8.23)
Crisis .242
(.77)
Mix .063
(1.29)
Private .061
(.65)
Leverage .007
(1.61)
Profit −.025*
(−1.93)
Size −.180***
(−15.37)
Age −.002***
(−2.75)
Group −.993***
(−19.38)
Ownership −.619***
(−12.54)
Exchange 6.438***
(3.75)
Policy 1.491***
(3.70)
Observations 51,101
Log likelihood −12,983
Test of equality (p value)
Sigma*Mix .003
Notes: Proportional hazard model results are reported.
The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm
fails, and 0 otherwise. Robust z-statistics are presented in
parentheses. Sigma*Mix refers to the test of equality between
Sigma*Mix*Crisis and Sigma*Mix*(1-Crisis). Time, indus-
try, and regional dummies are included in all models.
*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant
at 1%.
Public Versus Private Firms. In a final explo-
ration we investigate whether the behavior of
public firms is different from that of private
firms. Our rationale for the categorization of
public versus nonpublic firms stems from the
fact that public companies are typically larger
and less informationaly opaque. Private compa-
nies, on the other hand, face a higher degree
of information asymmetry and tend to be more
financially constrained. As a consequence, for
these firms lenders typically command higher
borrowing costs resulting to higher spreads (see
Brav 2009; Caglayan and Rashid 2014). We
hypothesize, therefore, that private firms aremore
likely to respond more strongly to uncertainty
compared with public firms, especially during
the crisis period. Hence, we interact a dummy
variable representing the private firms (Private)
TABLE 5
Uncertainty, Ownership Structure, and the Crisis
Sigma*Private*Crisis 1.105***
(5.36)
Sigma*Private*(1-Crisis) .715***
(9.67)
Sigma*(1-Private)*Crisis .653***
(3.91)
Sigma*(1-Private)*(1-Crisis) 1.056***
(2.96)
Crisis .245
(.78)
Mix .237***
(5.22)
Private .31
(1.15)
Leverage .008
(1.63)
Profit −.024*
(−1.87)
Size −.179***
(−15.36)
Age −.002**
(−2.44)
Group −.992***
(−19.38)
Ownership −.617***
(−12.53)
Exchange 6.475***
(3.76)
Policy 1.500***
(3.71)
Observations 51,101
Log likelihood −12,956
Test of equality (p value)
Sigma*Private .074
Sigma*(1-Private) .309
Sigma*Crisis .070
Sigma*(1-Crisis) .347
Notes: Proportional hazard model results are reported.
The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the
firm fails, and 0 otherwise. Robust z-statistics are pre-
sented in parentheses. Sigma*Private refers to the test
of equality between Sigma*Private*Crisis and Sigma*
Private*(1-Crisis). Sigma*(1-Private) refers to the test of
equality between Sigma*(1-Private)*Crisis and Sigma*
(1-Private)*(1-Crisis). Sigma*Crisis refers to the test
of equality between Sigma*Private*Crisis and Sigma*
(1-Private)*Crisis. Finally, Sigma*(1-Crisis) refers to the test
of equality between Sigma*Private*(1-Crisis) and Sigma*(1-
Private)*(1-Crisis). Time, industry, and regional dummies
are included in all models.
*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant
at 1%.
with crisis and noncrisis periods and our measure
of firm-specific uncertainty.
The results are reported in Table 5. For private
firms there is a significant difference in response
compared to public firms. Firm-specific uncer-
tainty is a highly significant determinant of firm
survival during the crisis compared to tranquil
periods. The response of public firms matches
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that of the less bank-dependent firms reported
above.Whenwe consider public firms both in and
out of the crisis, we find that there is no signif-
icantly different response in crisis with respect
to uncertainty. We also note that the Mix ratio
attains a positive coefficient which is signifi-
cant at the 1% level. This finding shows that
bank dependency affects the hazard rate directly
since greater levels of bank reliance are likely
to increase the probability of firm failure. We
conclude that public and private firms may face
different credit supply conditions based on their
specific characteristics, and responded differently
during the most recent crisis.
VI. ROBUSTNESS TESTS
A. Re-Defining Firm-Specific Uncertainty
Thus far, we have used the 3-yearmoving stan-
dard deviation of the unpredictable part of sales
to generate our uncertainty measure. To check the
robustness of our results, we follow Caglayan,
Maioli, andMateut (2012) and construct the firm-
specific uncertainty measure using a 4-year mov-
ing standard deviation (Sigma2).21
The results are reported in Table 6. In agree-
ment with our main results, we show that the
firm-specific uncertainty is more important in
predicting firm failures during the crisis com-
pared with tranquil times. In addition, we find
that bank-dependent firms’ survival chances are
affected significantly more by changes in uncer-
tainty during the crisis compared with more
tranquil periods. In sum, we argue that our main
findings are robust to an alternative definition of
firm-specific uncertainty.
B. An Alternative Definition for Bank
Dependency
To ensure the robustness of our findings, we
re-define the variable indicating firms’ reliance
on bank debt using the ratio of short-term debt
to total current liabilities (Mix2). The results are
reported in Table 7. Once again, we find that
the crisis intensified the effects of uncertainty
and firms that were bank dependent faced signif-
icantly higher chances of failure compared with
less bank-dependent firms. These results suggest
that our main findings are robust to using a dif-
ferent definition for the bank dependency.
21. We also experimented with measuring firm-specific
uncertainty using firms’ real sales calculated over all years
TABLE 6
Robustness: Alternative Definition of
Uncertainty
(1) (2)
Sigma2*Crisis .717***
(6.07)
Sigma2*(1-Crisis) .419***
(4.64)
Crisis .279*** .227
(3.69) (.69)
Sigma2*Mix*Crisis .890***
(5.96)
Sigma2*Mix*(1-Crisis) .520***
(6.26)
Mix .104*
(1.92)
Leverage .017*** .015**
(3.26) (2.90)
Profit −.018 −.019
(−1.32) (−1.18)
Size −.206*** −.204***
(−15.48) (−15.31)
Age −.002* −.002**
(−1.89) (−2.16)
Group −.950*** −.946***
(−16.42) (−16.37)
Ownership −.550*** −.555***
(−10.16) (−10.15)
Exchange 6.019*** 6.005***
(3.67) (3.67)
Policy 1.393*** 1.391***
(3.62) (3.61)
Private .065
(.61)
Observations 44,559 44,559
Log likelihood −10,472 −10,473
Test of equality (p value)
Sigma2 .055
Sigma2*Mix .027
Notes: Proportional hazard model results are reported.
The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the
firm fails, and 0 otherwise. Robust z-statistics are pre-
sented in parentheses. Sigma2*Mix refers to the test of
equality between Sigma2*Mix*Crisis and Sigma2*Mix*(1-
Crisis). Time, industry, and regional dummies are included in
all models.
*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant
at 1%.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
It is well established in the theoretical and
empirical literature that uncertainty has negative
consequences for economic activity. However,
there is some debate about the exact mecha-
nism by which uncertainty affects the economy.
The recent financial crisis has highlighted that
violations of Modigliani–Miller theorem may
preceding and including year t. Our results were robust to
this modification.
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TABLE 7
Robustness: Alternative Definition of Bank
Dependency
Sigma*Mix2*Crisis 1.670***
(5.47)
Sigma*Mix2*(1-Crisis) 1.007***
(8.21)
Crisis .243
(.76)
Mix2 −.071
(−1.10)
Private .056
(.60)
Leverage .007
(1.60)
Profit −.024*
(−1.89)
Size −.185***
(−16.65)
Age −.002***
(−2.82)
Group −.991***
(−19.36)
Ownership −.623***
(−12.64)
Exchange 6.438***
(3.74)
Policy 1.492***
(3.69)
Observations 51,101
Log likelihood −13,044
Test of equality (p value)
Sigma*Mix2 .037
Notes: Proportional hazard model results are reported.
The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the
firm fails, and 0 otherwise. Robust z-statistics are pre-
sented in parentheses. Sigma*Mix2 refers to the test of
equality between Sigma*Mix2*Crisis and Sigma*Mix2*(1-
Crisis). Time, industry, and regional dummies are included in
all models.
*Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant
at 1%.
be more transparent due to the specific banking
nature of the Great Financial Crisis. And while
stock markets did suffer, the impact was much
more temporary. Financial markets were acting as
an accelerator or amplifier of economic shocks,
including uncertainty.
One popular idea is financial conditions accel-
erate the uncertainty impact on the economy. This
paper sought to examine the uncertainty-firm sur-
vival nexus, with particular reference to finan-
cial interactions. Using a large firm-level data set
we consider how financial conditions may have
altered during the recent financial crisis, over and
above the effects of firm-level uncertainty. We
also explore whether bank-dependent and private
companies are impacted to a greater extent by
uncertainty. It may be reasonable to expect that
firms exhibiting greater reliance on bank debt and
nonpublic firms shall be more sensitive to uncer-
tainty, for example due to an increase in the size
of their external finance premium or the extent of
available credit.
Our results document a significant effect of
uncertainty on firm survival. This link is found to
be more potent during the recent financial crisis
compared with tranquil periods. We also uncover
significant firm-level heterogeneity because the
survival chances of bank-dependent and non-
public firms are most affected by changes in
uncertainty, especially during the recent global
financial crisis. Our findings are of interest to
policy makers who should take into account the
response of firms to uncertainty when they con-
template policies that will make finance to com-
panies more readily available.
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